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Executive Summary
Soil degradation, a process that reduces the poten­
tial of land to support animal and plant production, 
has become one of the most pressing problems for 
farmers worldwide [Scherr 1999], Based on the 
opinions of 250 international experts, the United 
Nations Global Land Assessment of Degradation 
concluded as early as 1992 that degradation had 
caused a 38 percent loss in global agricultural land 
since the 1940s [Oldeman et al. 1992], This soil loss, 
at a rate of 5 to 10 million hectares per year, has 
multiple causes, including nutrient and vegetative 
depletion, agrochemical pollution, deforestation, 
and soil erosion due to severe floods, wind, and 
steep hillside farming [Scherr and Yadav 1996],
Despite dire forecasts, Dregne and Chou [1992] 
estimated that reduced soil quality would not 
threaten the balance of international food supply in 
the near decades. What warrants close scrutiny, 
however, is the regional impact of these changes, 
particularly in hot spots where degradation may be 
reversible only through costly on-farm investments 
or engineering strategies, if at all (Scherr and Yadav 
1996). Drylands alone are 70 percent degraded, 
affecting nearly 2 billion people (FAO 2002). 
Regionally, Latin America has the highest propor­
tion of degraded agricultural land in the world, 
followed by Africa (Scherr and Yadav 1996).
Peru's north coast, the focus of this case study, is 
threatened most by salinization, a process that can 
cause irreversible desert-like conditions (UNEP 
1992). With salinization now affecting up to 40 per­
cent of cropland on the north coast (Collado 
2001), the situation could have national repercus­
sions. Although the coastal valleys make up only 
3.8 percent of Peruvian agricultural land, including 
pasture and forest, they yield 50 percent of Peru's 
gross agricultural product (Vera 2006). Despite a 
history of intensive agriculture on the north coast 
that extends back to 200 C.E. (Nordt et al. 2004), 
it appears that recent changes—irrigation practices, 
rice-focused production, and limited opportunities 
to invest in or build the capacity for soil conserva­
tion—have exacerbated the susceptibility of soil in 
the region to salinization.
The Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations (FAO), World Bank, and United 
Nations all agree that soil conditions may improve 
most through community initiatives that increase
productivity sustainably while improving the 
economies of poor households dependent on agri­
culture (Dixon et al. 2001; UNCCD 2005). One 
program implemented in the Peruvian coastal 
department of Piura by the nongovernmental 
organization (NGO) Heifer Project International 
(HPI) appears to have had success. HPI's key strate­
gies focused on participatory planning and man­
agement with leaders of local irrigation commis­
sions, training in eco-agriculture practices, and 
rotating funds for small-scale livestock and seeds 
for alternative crops. After three years, the project 
expanded from 20 households to 689, and farmers 
reported reduced salinization, lower input costs, 
and increased production and income. Despite HPI's 
apparent success, some development theorists 
question whether local impacts like this can last or 
how valuable they are to broader systems without 
scaling up.
Considering the wider policy environment pre­
sented here, your assignment is to determine the 
next steps you would take if you were directing 
HPI in Peru. Who would you target, how, and why? 
Should HPI continue working exclusively with 
farmers, or should your organization try to partner 
with or influence other civil society actors, policy 
makers, agrochemical companies, or credit agen­
cies? Ultimately, where is your comparative advan­
tage as an institution, and what are the risks of 
attempting to target certain actions and ignoring 
others?
Background
Primary agricultural production amounts to 8.5 
percent of Peru's gross domestic product [CIA 
2007), but more than 37 percent of the population 
is employed in the agricultural sector [ECLAC 
2005). The most recent agricultural census in 1994 
showed that more than 60 percent of the country's 
1.8 million farms were smaller than five hectares and 
of poor quality [INEI 1994). Antolin Huascar, 
president of the National Agrarian Confederation, 
and Hernando De Soto, president of the Institute 
for Liberty and Democracy, claim that of the 8 
million farmers and rural laborers in Peru, concen­
trated along the north coast, only I million own 
their land and have access to financing (Salazar 
2006; Fernandez-Morera 1999; Figure I). As the
following policy analysis illustrates, it is these small- 
scale farmers who are most affected and least able 
to reverse rapid salinization. Salinization rose from 
affecting 20 percent of Piura cropland in 1963 to
40 percent in 2000 [Figure 2], Although owner­
ship rights are unclear, 95 percent of Piura farms 
are less than five hectares.
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Figure 2 : Percentage o f Salinized Cropland in Piura, 1963-2000
Policy Analysis
Among the factors that appear linked to increasing 
rates of salinization in Piura are modern irrigation 
infrastructure and management systems, a focus on 
water-intensive rice production in the past 30 
years, and several factors—costly agrochemical 
inputs, limited access to credit, and a poorly coor­
dinated institutional environment—that have
reduced the capacity of small-scale farmers to 
invest in soil conservation practices.
Necessary but Problematic Irrigation 
Systems
The extreme desert conditions along Peru's north 
coast have required effective irrigation and drainage 
systems for controlling water variability and over­
coming the tendency of soils to salinize for cen­
turies (Nordt et al. 2004], Yearly rainfall in this 
region averages 23.2 millimeters, and sometimes as 
little as 12 millimeters over a period of several years 
(Nordt et al. 2004; Siversten and Lundberg 1996], 
Combined with high temperatures, the sandy, 
mineral soil experiences high evapotranspiration 
rates that draw moisture up from the water table 
and deposit salts on the surface. If managed effec­
tively, irrigation can promote effective leaching of 
minerals. Poor drainage systems, however, allow 
clay particles to accumulate, eventually leading to 
waterlogging and the buildup of toxic chemicals 
and salts.
In their case study of irrigation systems along the 
north coast, Siversten and Lundberg (I996)1 found 
that pre-Inca, earthen canals are still used in some 
areas to channel runoff from the Andes, but this 
traditional system changed during the 1950s when 
the central government began promoting commer­
cialized, intensive agriculture. Modern irrigation 
systems with reservoirs and new concrete canals 
improved the speed, amount, and timing of water 
many coastal farmers received, but over time it also 
increased the tendency of soils to salinize (Figure
1 Some caution is required regarding the conclusions 
Siversten and Lundberg (1996] draw, because they pro­
vide little description o f their methodology. They draw 
on an extensive literature review, use national statistical 
databases, and describe comparisons o f "distinct" villages 
and case studies o f three farmers, not selected randomly, 
who represented three sizes o f farms (1, 7, and 6 0  hec­
tares].
2]. Whereas previous irrigation systems relied on 
the flow of rivers and runoff and thereby distri­
buted nutrients and minerals to fields as a way of 
maintaining soil fertility, now nutrients and miner­
als become trapped in the basins of dams. The con­
crete canals prevent seepage, which was critical for 
keeping the water table low and the process of salt 
accumulation slow. Finally, many of these new sys­
tems are poorly constructed and require regular 
maintenance of drainage systems, critical for pre­
venting waterlogging.
Siversten and Lundberg (1996] also concluded that 
the irrigation system they studied in the bordering 
department of Lambayeque did not benefit all 
farmers equally. Access to effective maintenance 
and to sufficient and predictable amounts of water 
was often dependent on political influence or 
higher payments. Each sub-department in the north 
coast has a local irrigation commission, or 
Comision de Regantes, responsible for coordinating 
upkeep and deciding the timing, amount, and cost 
of water distribution. Sub-departments in 
Lambayeque with more political influence, and 
often larger landowners, were able to secure state 
investment for new concrete canals and drainage 
systems. This investment in the mid-1980s allowed 
some municipalities in the region to reduce saliniza­
tion problems over nine years and to transport 
larger amounts of water, increasing their produc­
tion of rice. Neighboring municipalities with older 
irrigation canals, smaller landholdings, and poor 
drainage systems, on the other hand, experienced 
gradually worsening soil conditions. Additionally, 
when water is scarce from June to December, some 
farmers, particularly large landowners, obtain more 
than their share by buying at higher prices or ille­
gally siphoning upstream. Farmers with capital can 
also install pumps or windmills to draw ground- 
water or build small reservoirs to collect rainfall or 
water released through the irrigation system.
An Emphasis on Rice Production
In Piura, irrigation systems may be less to blame 
for current soil problems than the amount of 
water-intensive rice produced. During the 1990s, 
Piura farmers began planting more rice than any 
other crop, and by 2004 the department was the 
second-largest producer in Peru (Boucher 2002],
High national rice prices during the 1990s moti­
vated much of this production, as did the Ministry 
of Agriculture's subsidies for rice cultivation in the 
north coast [Vinatea 2005], Between 1994 and 
2004, after indigenous chicken meat, paddy rice 
competed with potato production as the most 
important agricultural commodity produced in 
Peru [ranked by value] [FAO 2004], Rice also out­
paced most crops in the total land area dedicated 
to its cultivation. In 1990 cotton, corn, and rice 
were planted in nearly equal amounts [between
140.000 and 190,000 hectares], but by 2003 
cotton had fallen to less than 70,000 hectares and 
corn and rice had increased to 260,000 and
320.000 hectares, respectively [Notte 2004].
For some small-scale farmers, however, rice 
production appears to be leading them into a 
difficult trap. The situation is described in a case 
study in Siversten and Lundberg [1996] and in an 
HPI-Peru report based on five years of work with 
more than 600 Piura farmers whose farms averaged 
1.7 hectares [Abramonte and Rodriguez 2005b], 
National policies and a lack of markets for crops 
other than rice make it difficult for farmers to 
diversify along the north coast. Sometimes their 
choice is made when water from neighboring farms 
inundates their fields. Yet if they cannot control 
when this water arrives or invest in or maintain 
effective drainage systems, fields can become 
waterlogged and salinized. Rice production also 
requires large amounts of water to cover rice 
seedlings, increasing costs; the volume of water 
required is even greater if a farmer cannot afford 
to have his or her field leveled to ensure that all 
areas are adequately covered. Even if rice 
production can be sustained at first, the effects of 
frequent droughts and fluctuating international 
prices [Mori 2006] gradually reduce the profit 
margin. As one HPI project farmer says, it may not 
make sense for small-scale Piura farmers to maintain 
a dependence on rice production:
Here, we [HPI project members in Piura] 
have to work hard with trainings to 
develop a culture that doesn't plant rice on 
the coast because the cost of water is high.
We cannot continue insisting or count on 
an infrastructure that is so costly with 
large dams, canals, and drains to continue 
cultivating rice, a crop that in the long­
term is not profitable for producers. The
training must begin in school, to create an 
awareness that we must begin planting 
alternative crops [Abramonte and 
Rodriguez 2005b, 41],
An Agrochemical Culture
As the profits from key crops like rice fall for 
small-scale farmers, another common practice that 
keeps production costs high in Piura—agrochemical 
use—is further diminishing poor farmers' ability 
acquire the necessary capital at the start of each 
season to make long-term investments in their 
farms. Along with irrigation, farmers in Piura have 
always needed high levels of nitrogen inputs. Nordt 
et al. [2004], for instance, found that pre-Inca 
cotton farmers along the coast left leguminous 
algarrobo trees standing among fields for leaf litter 
fertilizer as well as adding inputs of seabird guano, 
llama dung, and fish heads.
Although there are few data about agrochemical 
use specific to Piura, Figure 3 illustrates how 
chemical use across Peru has steadily increased 
since 1980, as it has in South America and devel­
oping countries generally. With agriculture concen­
trated along Peru's north coast, it is safe to assume 
that this increase is disproportionately concen­
trated in departments like Piura. HPI staff report 
that, before the farmers they worked with adopted 
eco-agriculture approaches, agrochemicals consti­
tuted 30 to 40 percent of their production costs. 
Few were using low-cost methods to build soil 
nutrients, such as nitrogen-fixing trees, manure, 
compost, or crop residue [Abramonte and 
Rodriguez 2005b], In a 2005 rapid appraisal of 
HPI's impacts2 co-Ied by the author and 2 HPI field 
staff, nearly all 30 farmers and 5 irrigation commis­
sion leaders interviewed discussed the marketing 
and cultural pressure they felt to use chemical fer­
tilizers and pesticides. A "mentality" that agro­
chemicals were necessary for productive farming 
had developed. As one farmer described,
2 Fieldwork for two days took place in six of the seven 
project communities. It involved interviews with 24 
individuals from 10 project households and one focus 
group with 11 project members [including 5 irrigation 
commission leaders, who were the local HPI project 
leaders]. The focus group was open to all project 
members, while households were selected by HPI staff to 
represent the communities involved and those they felt 
were most and least successful project members.
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“[Neighbors] used to say 1 was a cochino [filthy 
person] because I put down manure" (Medio Bajo 
Piura Heifer Project Farmer 2005], Faced with 
salinization or other soil degradation, small-scale 
farmers may feel forced to increase fertilizer inputs. 
Disregarding the possibility that farmers may be 
increasing the alkalinity of the soil through exces­
sive fertilizer use, such high inputs further under­
cut short-term profits and their ability to make 
investments for long-term soil improvement.
Conservation-Discouraging Credit Policies
Access to loans could help farmers make the 
investments necessary to improve their soils, 
increase their production, and reduce their risk 
over the long term. The Inter-American 
Development Bank [IADB] describes how credit 
policies in the Andes instead discriminate against 
resource-poor farmers and in so doing, discourage 
long-term soil management (IADB 2001], Because of 
the obstacles they confront, small-scale farmers 
often choose not to take out loans or feel they 
have no access to credit agencies; a survey of 500 
farmers in Piura by the University of California at 
Davis found that 42 percent of them had no loans
in 20033 (Figure 4; Guirkinger 2005], For those 
who do have loans with high interest rates, 
repaying them, rather than making productive 
investments, often becomes a short-term priority. 
Arslan (2003] predicts that both of these situations 
can cause a spiral effect, where the natural resource 
base can deteriorate more rapidly, ultimately 
making it difficult for farmers to make investments 
and increasing their susceptibility to shock.
When farmers do seek out loans, smallholders 
often cannot get access to formal credit with low 
interest rates because they lack the necessary 
collateral (Boucher 2002], The UC Davis survey, 
for instance, found that only 18 percent of Piura 
farmers in 2003 had formal loans, and many who 
did were large landowners (Guirkinger 2005]. As 
Arsalan (2003] describes, the assets poor farmers 
do have are typically informal and cannot be used 
for collateral, whereas those who do have enough 
collateral may fear losing their primary productive 
asset. Even if farmers can obtain formal loans, if
3 Six percent o f farmers had "semi-formal" loans offered 
by NGOs and targeted government programs. These are 
described more in the "Policy Options" section.
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they default, they face higher interest rates and are 
denied additional formal loans until their debt is 
paid [Guirkinger 2005], In this situation they are 
often forced to acquire a loan from the informal 
sector to help pay off their original formal loan. 
The IADB [2001] also describes how financial crises 
reduce what few resources poor farmers might 
have, further lowering their ability to turn to the 
formal financial sector for help. Unfortunately, this 
scenario has been true for many vulnerable farmers 
as crop prices have fallen owing to macroeconomic 
factors across Latin America and Peru, forcing 
them to acquire whatever loans they can to pay off 
existing debts [Guirkinger 2005],
Whether farmers take out informal loans out of 
choice or necessity, local lenders are often more 
accessible and pose fewer risks for small-scale 
farmers in the short term. In the 2003 study, 27 
percent of Piura farmers had only informal loans 
and 7 percent a combination of formal and infor­
mal loans [Guirkinger 2005], Informal lenders offer 
a form of insurance not provided by the formal
sector: additional financing even as a farmer is 
trying to repay a previous debt. Informal loans are 
also virtually collateral-free, and going to your local 
moneylender has fewer transaction costs [the time 
to secure a loan, travel costs, and procedural costs]. 
These lenders do, however, charge interest rates up 
to twice as high as those of formal lenders 
[Boucher 2002]. Local farmers also described 
another drawback: in return for an informal loan, 
farmers are sometimes forced to sell their harvest 
to the moneylender at a cost below the market 
value [Abramonte and Rodriguez 2005b],
A Changing Institutional Climate
Changing any of the previous policies depends 
largely on the type of institutional support and 
coordination that surrounds farmers. During the 
1990s the Peruvian government instituted two 
major plans that had the potential to help farmers 
in departments like Piura improve their livelihoods: 
it decentralized the Ministry of Agriculture, and it 
undertook a national action plan to fight desertifi­
cation. The result has instead appeared to create 
more disarray and what Llambi and Lindemann 
[2001, 3] describe as a "notorious vacuum in the 
institutional apparatus of the country."
The process of decentralization began affecting 
Peruvian agriculture in 1992 with the Organic Law 
of the Ministry of Agriculture. This law parceled 
out the Ministry of Agriculture's support services 
and regulatory functions to local municipal 
governments. Although rural municipalities in Peru 
are often more involved in local agriculture and can 
be held accountable more easily by local communi­
ties, the administrative process of decentralization 
was not accompanied by sufficient capacity building 
or funds to optimize the effects it might have had. 
In their assessment of Peru's decentralization 
process, Llambi and Lindemann [2001] point out 
that municipal governments often do not know the 
national laws, lack administrative capacity to raise 
funds and design or monitor investment projects, 
and do not have the knowledge to negotiate with 
other public agencies or private firms. Most impor­
tant, local governments often have little informa­
tion about the larger political and economic 
environment to help them develop long-term 
development strategies. According to Lindemann 
and Llambi [2001, 3], this has resulted in "manage­
ment through projects" with no coherent long­
term plans. As they describe it, a "project approach 
to sectoral policy creates . . .  an overabundance of 
ad hoc institutions with a short life span. More­
over, these generally locally-based or subsectorally- 
oriented projects are not designed to address the 
structural causes of rural poverty."
Just as municipalities were facing this new institu­
tional setting, in 1996 Peru joined the United 
Nations Convention to Combat Desertification 
[UNCCD] with its ambitious national action plan to 
fight desertification [referred to as PAN-Peru], 
Piura first appeared to be one of the most 
organized departments with its "Piura 2010" plan 
[Guevara 1999], This plan was intended to heighten 
communication and collaboration around issues of 
natural resource management across public agen­
cies, universities, unions, NGOs, and businesses. 
Local institutions, including the National University 
of Piura, the Peruvian Center for Social Studies 
[CEPES], the Agrarian University of Molina, and 
the Center for the Study and Promotion of Rural 
Information [CIPCA], were to monitor environ­
mental issues in the area. The media was also 
involved, with The Green Crusade newsletter 
launched by the newspaper El Tiempo and the 
"Cutivalu" radio show that discussed environmental 
and agriculture issues facing the area.
Despite this earlier coordination and other Piura- 
based initiatives sparked by NGOs, municipalities, 
and communities, these efforts were not part of 
integrated regional or national policy [Guevara 
1999], PAN-Peru did not in fact become the "cen­
tral reference" to guide these institutions and 
projects [Valderrama 2001], and the regional asso­
ciation that formed to develop Piura 2010 no 
longer functioned by 2002 [INRENA 2002], As 
Guevara observed in 1999, the coordinating bodies 
that did exist in Piura were relatively isolated and 
restricted to the academic community or other 
limited circles and not utilized in a coordinated way 
by the business sector, communities, or municipal 
government. The committees or commissions that 
did involve these multiple stakeholders were typi­
cally short-lived and established to take action on 
immediate, not long-term, structural problems.
Policy Options
For a country like Peru, where less than 3 percent 
of the total land area is arable [ECLAC 2005], 
slowing or reversing the current rate of land 
degradation within its most valuable agricultural 
region is critical for protecting the nation's future 
economic growth and food supply. For the vast 
majority of poor farmers along the coast who rely 
on agriculture as their principal livelihood, it is a 
question of how quickly, affordably, and sustain­
ably their soil quality can be improved. A number 
of policy options exist to address the multiple 
factors discussed, but it is unclear which of these 
issues is the most critical, who should address 
them, and by what means.
The Heifer Project International Approach
The FAO, World Bank, and United Nations all 
agree that combating soil degradation may work 
best through community-based initiatives (Dixon et 
al. 2001; UNCCD 2005], HPI's Piura soil improve­
ment program, mentioned previously, appears to 
bear out this idea: it has led to sustainable increases 
in yields and improvements in the socioeconomic
conditions of households dependent on crop 
production.4
Working out of the lower Piura region, referred to 
as Bajo Piura, the HPI-Peru office started in 2001 
with 20 smallholders considered locos, the crazy 
men in their communities. These were smallholders 
willing to take a risk, innovate, and become show­
pieces capable of convincing neighbors that their 
efforts would be successful. Through participatory 
planning sessions, HPI considered with farmers 
what factors would motivate them to make long­
term changes to their system of production in 
ways that would minimize risks to their yields or 
income levels in the short term. Using ecological 
agriculture practices, the long-term goal was to 
recoup highly salinized land, reduce input costs, 
increase profits, and improve food security.
Over a period of three years, the first phase 
focused on improving soil fertility by replacing 
costly agrochemical inputs with substitutes like 
manure, vermiculture, crop residue, mulch, and 
bird guano. The second phase focused on diversi­
fying farm production without competing with 
other crops. This phase included planting locally 
adapted fruit trees [mango, lime, and tamarind] or 
nitrogen-fixing leguminous plants along paths, 
borders, or other open field space. Many house­
holds also received a small starter herd of sheep, to 
which they fed readily available crop residues and 
from which they received manure for fertilizer, 
meat to supplement family nutrition, and a "living 
bank"—an asset they can sell in case of 
emergencies.
The goal for the final stage was sustainable agro- 
ecological production. To ensure these efforts 
would last in the long term, HPI staff worked to 
build the capacity of local irrigation commissions to 
carry on similar agroecology initiatives by involving 
leaders in the design, implementation, monitoring, 
and evaluation of the project in their communities. 
The local commissions chose 25 community mem­
bers to become trained as agroecology promoters 
to offer training and support to project members. 
Five community members were also trained as
4 Descriptions o f this HPI project come from the Heifer- 
Peru 2005 report [Abramonte and Rodriguez 2005b] 
and the 2005 rapid appraisal co-led by the author, 
described in footnote 2.
informal veterinarians to provide (at a substantially 
reduced cost) vaccination campaigns and basic 
veterinary skills to livestock owners (both project 
members and nonmembers). In HPI's tradition, 
families each contributed to a "Passing on the Gift" 
rotating fund to provide additional families with 
sheep, vegetable seeds and fruit trees, basic 
equipment (such as plastic barrels for making 
organic fertilizer), and funds to replenish veterinary 
kits. Workshops and farmer-to-farmer exchanges 
focused on homemade insecticides, compost fer­
tilizer, other agroecology practices, leadership 
building, and gender-focused personal and family 
empowerment.
By 2004 the HPI-Peru office reported expanding 
from 20 participants and 3 irrigation commissions 
to 689 households and 7 irrigation commissions 
[Abramonte and Rodriguez 2005b). More than 
300 households had expanded into livestock pro­
duction (primarily for self-consumption], and all 
were incorporating some aspect of agroecology 
[such as using manure compost, tilling crop residue 
into the soil rather than burning it, or using 
homemade organic insecticides] or diversifying 
their production. Irrigation commissions were 
expanding their work plans beyond issues of water 
management to hold additional training in agro­
ecology and leadership. Project members also spoke 
of efforts to push the larger Piura irrigation board 
to coordinate with state institutions to support 
policies favoring agroecology development in rural 
zones.
Although no systematic quantitative data were 
gathered, during the rapid appraisal conducted in 
2005, all 35 project members interviewed discussed 
the input costs they saved using fewer agro­
chemicals; the salinized land area they had 
recovered; the increased production they had 
experienced (often double the amount, which the 
evaluation team observed by comparing fields that 
were salinized, recovered, or nonproject); and the 
higher income they had gained from these 
practices. The majority also talked of a critical 
change they and their neighbors had experienced in 
their mentality, or approach to farming. By the end 
of the project, all saw manure and mulch as valua­
ble forms of fertilizer and had replaced at least a 
portion of their previous agrochemical use with 
these substances and other low-cost, homemade 
insecticides and fertilizers. They all had fewer fields
devoted to monocrops of rice, cotton, or corn. 
They were eager to plant more locally adapted 
fruits and vegetables and were more aware of the 
importance and means of building soil quality 
through eco-agriculture methods.
Additional Policy Options
Despite HPI's apparent success, some development 
theorists question how long local impacts like this 
will last and how valuable they are to broader 
systems if they do not scale up. A project involving 
689 households may be large by NGO standards, 
but its reach is small in a department that encom­
passes a rural population of more than 1 million 
[Brinkhoff 2007], HPI may be yet another ad hoc 
institution that cannot have an impact on the struc­
tural causes of poverty and broad-based natural 
resource problems. Llambi and Lindemann [2001], 
for instance, suggest that locally based projects like 
HPI's need to collaborate with national economic 
strategies and sectoral policies. Although it appears 
that there are many research institutions, state 
agencies, private sector agencies, international 
organizations, and local NGOs involved with similar 
natural resource management efforts in Piura, HPI 
only discusses their involvement with the local irri­
gation commissions and never deals with them 
directly.
HPI-Peru staff, for instance, fail to discuss how 
affordable, less discriminatory credit might benefit 
the poor farmers. Boucher [2002,1] describes how 
liberalization and free markets create a context 
where "the ability of institutions to overcome the 
obstacles to providing affordable credit to small 
farmers will play a key role in determining which 
farmers will be able to participate and which will be 
forced to exit the sector through land rental or 
sale." Some government programs and NGOs in 
Piura already offer "semi-formal" subsidized credit 
with low interest rates and flexible collateral 
requirements, but currently they make up a small 
percentage of the value of all loans in the area, and 
access is restricted to targeted government pro­
grams or communities where these few NGOs 
work [Guirkinger 2005],
HPI also appears to have overlooked [or may not 
have the capacity to influence] the markets these 
small-scale farmers can access. Several farmers 
interviewed during the rapid appraisal hoped to
find markets for their organic fruits and vegetables, 
but reported having few prospects for reaching 
regional or national markets. At least two hoping 
to export internationally described the practical 
need for a critical mass of neighboring farmers to 
also make the shift to these alternative crops 
[Scriven et al. 2005],
Like many NGOs, HPI has not yet considered 
engaging the private sector. In a similar situation in 
Rangpur, Bangladesh, excessive and inappropriate 
use of fertilizers was increasing the alkalinity of the 
soil, reducing soil productivity, and increasing 
farmers' expenses. Katalyst, a project implemented 
by Swisscontact and GTZ International Services and 
supported by the U.K. Department for Interna­
tional Development [DFID], other major donors, 
and the Ministry of Commerce, supported the 
creation of a private business focused on soil test­
ing for vegetable production. Preliminary results 
appeared to show that farmers who paid for this 
service had reduced use of chemical fertilizers, 
greater use of organic composting, and improved 
soil health [Katalyst-Bangladesh 2004],
This case study raises the critical question of what 
role the central government should play in projects 
like HPI's. The government already appears to be 
taking on a share of what HPI was trying to do. 
Reacting both to problems of salinization and to 
lower rice prices, in February 2006 the Peruvian 
Ministry of Agriculture announced a "Plan to Con­
vert Rice Cultivations" on up to 10,000 hectares 
(Mori 2006], Farmers are being promised financial 
and technical assistance in deciding which crops 
would be most appropriate and most lucrative on 
the international market, including artichokes, 
paprika, peppers, citrus, or mangos. Although the 
ministry's plan to help farmers diversify has poten­
tial, it does not discuss the pacing of implementa­
tion, which farmers will be targeted, and how they 
intend to ensure farmer livelihoods during the 
transition. It also fails to consider parallel strategies 
for improving soil quality or for addressing the 
strong culture of agrochemical use, an input cost 
that may continue to rise even as farmers invest in 
higher-value crops.
Assignment
What steps should Heifer Project International take 
next to ensure that small-scale farmers in Piura im­
prove their livelihoods and maintain soil improve­
ments? Like many NGOs, the Heifer-Peru office 
has little empirical evidence upon which to base its 
decision at the completion of this project. Staff 
have farmer testimonials, informal reports, one 
external rapid appraisal, and personal experience. 
Yet time is of the essence as the region as a whole 
continues to experience rapid soil degradation. 
Market trends, national policies, or agromarketing 
could potentially reverse the apparent gains HPI 
farmers have made. Based on the HPI impact 
reports and the wider policy environment 
presented here, consider what direction you would 
take if you were directing the HPI-Peru office.
Who would you target, how, and why? Should HPI 
continue working exclusively with farmers, or 
should your organization try to partner with or 
influence other civil society actors, policy makers, 
agrochemical companies, or credit agencies? Could 
your staff, for instance, have a larger impact if you 
influenced the government to adopt more holistic 
strategies and provide more equitable support for 
irrigation and drainage infrastructure? Should part 
of this effort include building the capacity of 
marginalized irrigation commissions and farmers 
groups to advocate to local or national government 
for their needs? Would it be possible, and how 
would farmers fare, if you attempted to influence 
policies for alternative markets, state extension 
policies, or credit practices? Ultimately, where is 
your comparative advantage as an institution, and 
what are the risks of attempting to target certain 
actions or of ignoring others?
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